Introduction
In his famous book "Transforming Traditional Agriculture" for which he received the Nobel Prize, T. W. Schultz (1964, esp. 196-197) explains poverty through political opposition to the provision of public factors by large landowners. These public factors-basic education and basic scientific research-are held to be necessary for the formation of human capital. According to this view people are poor because taxes are low. Clearly, if public factors could be provided efficiently under conditions where Lindahl pricing or golden rules with perfect compensation are possible there would be no reason for large landowners to oppose this process even if they can only be provided by the government. Therefore, model theoretic interpretation of Schultz' explanation of poverty necessitates less idealistic assumptions.
The purposes of this paper is to provide a model that explains poverty-measured in terms of low wages-through tax resistance for which landlords may be an example, though not necessarily just landlordsalthough Schultz was mainly concerned with agricultural problems. The starting point are the Schultzian assumptions 1) that public factors are necessary for human capital formation and 2) that there is a central role for the government to provide them, because private supply could do this only in an imperfect manner. This paper does not question these assumptions but rather examines its consequences. Recent empirical evidence suggests that public factors in human capital formation is of outstanding importance in successful development strategies (H. Hughes, 1982, p. 233 ); yet up to now there exists no model which can provide a rationale for that. The line of the argument and the organization of the paper is as follows:
Section II sets out the basic model. Starting from the simplest neoclassical growth model without conventional technical progress-defined such that per capita income would increase even if there were no population growth-human capital is introduced in addition to physical capital and labor; a production function for human capital is added, in which public factors and labor-employed at given individually different labor-augmenting abilities-are necessary factors of production. Public factors by assumption are provided by the government-needless to say, without this assumption the problem posed by Schultz would not exist; as Lindahl taxation is infeasible because the government cannot know individual endowments and abilities, a flat-rate income tax is assumed. The non-rivalrous character * I would like to thank Johannes Schneider, Winfried Vogt and two anonymous referees for their helpful and encouraging comments. The author is now at State University of Limburg, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
(C Oxford University Press 1990 of public factors produces the outcome that per capita output and real wages will grow at the rate of population growth multiplied by the elasticity of public factors in human capital production and the elasticity of human capital in output production. If population growth were zero and therefore the non-rivalrous character of public factors were not used at an increasing rate, (per capita) output would be constant due to the assumed absence of conventional technical progress. From a more technical point of view the ultimate reason for increasing real wages may be viewed in the increasing returns produced by the non-rivalrous character of public factors. Whereas population growth is a threat to per capita income growth in the neoclassical dual economy model (Jorgenson, 1961 ) with non-augmentable land, public factors are a phenomenon which alleviates this threat because they are non-rivalrous in character. This may be viewed as a reason why development economists have placed so much emphasis on public goods for decades and still do in population economics today (cp. Kelley, 1988) .
So this paper contributes to the literature on growth under increasing returns to scale. Because of the central role played by public factors it is most similar to those papers where increasing returns arise because of externalities. Arrow's "learning by doing" (1962a) and the impossibility of keeping knowledge secret in Romer (1986) belong to this class. But an important distinction has to be made between them, namely that Arrows model exhibits increasing returns but diminishing marginal productivity of accumulated capital and therefore growth stops if population growth becomes zero, as in the model of this paper, whereas in Romer (1986) non-diminishing marginal productivity in cumulated knowledge ensures constant growth even without population growth. An entirely different class without externalities was initiated by Uzawa (1965) who endogenised technical progress in a manner which uses homogeneity of degree one and can be formulated such that all factors can be accumulated. Lucas (1988) has synthesized the contributions by Romer (1986) and Uzawa (1965) . Constant growth results that are very similar to those found under non-diminishing marginal productivity due to externalities can be obtained through increased specialisation as formalized by Romer (1987) or in the model of intergenerational technology transfer by Prescott and Boyd (1987) which uses a production function that must be homogeneous of degree one (at least) in knowledge of the old workers, or through Barro's "government factors" (1988) and human capital (1989), both using constant marginal productivity of capital. In Barro's model, government factors are not explicitly non-rivalrous and the decision concerning investment in human capital is very similar to Uzawas specification-except for endogenity of population growth-because both use a production function for average per capita human capital. Therefore different abilities play no role and no distributional conflict occurs, with the exception of a self-interested government imposed by mere assumption. What is entirely different in the model of this paper is the essential role of public factors which leads to an outstanding role for economic policy that is different from the internalization problem in the other papers because a distributional conflict occurs due to different abilities and endowments of individual households. Obviously, all papers model different aspects of technical progress. Section III discusses golden rule taxation for the flat-rate income tax, Lindahl pricing, and the effect on the level of wages if taxation deviates from these ideal situations under alternative assumptions on the determination of the tax rate. A conventional golden rule is derived for the rates of savings and taxation. It is shown that for an individual with average income and average abilities, the tax burden under golden rule and Lindahl pricing are equal. A median-voter, defined as an individual with lower than average income per hour spent in education, prefers higher than golden rule taxation and an individual with higher than average income per hour spent in education prefers lower taxation if compared to the golden rule. Whereas these preferences result simply from the redistributive effects of the flat-rate income tax, the consequence of lower taxation is a lower real wage, because the lower level of public factor provision leads to lower labor demand for educational purposes, thus increasing labor supply and therewith reducing real wages, which completes the interpretation of Schultz's theory of poverty. Thus emphasis in this paper is mainly on level effects of the distributional conflict. Its impact on the rate of technical progress in the sense of Uzawa (1965) will be analysed in a different paper.
Non-rivalrous common utilization of public factors in human capital formation as a driving force of growth
To keep matters as simple as possible, the subsequent model uses Cobb-Douglas functions throughout. One of the best known suggestions of T. W. Schultz is that production of output Y should not only be viewed as produced by physical capital K and labor LI. Additionally, we should take human capital H into account (s. Schultz, 1961) . Therefore, the first essential assumption here is that the representative firm produces one good under conditions of constant returns to scale:
Each individual [i = 1,..., N] can spend total endowment of labor services L' by selling it in the labor market as unskilled labor (Li) or using it in human capital (skilled labor) formation (L'):
The L' are individually different endowments, which can not be observed by the government. Equilibrium in the labor market requires that firm demand LI equals the sum of labor supplies: 
Goods market equilibrium requires that the firm's investment equals private savings out of net income:
where s is the average saving rate, most easily obtained by assuming identical saving rates obtainable from a utility function with unit income elasticity of consumption and savings. Identifying the labor force with total population and assuming constant population growth at rate n yields: 
Equating the right hand sides of (12) and (13) and making use of (12') implies:
indicates "growth rates". This means that the allocation of total labor between the production and educational purposes is determined by their production elasticities in regard to final output which can be most easily seen after insertion of (12') and (4) into (1). As the allocation of labor is technologically determined the two kinds of labor services must grow at identical rates. If it is assumed that the population reproduces at a constant average labor endowment Li, (2) The wage rate, per capita income, and the capital-labor ratios grow at the same rate. The last inequality results from (14"'). Therefore said rate plays the same role as the exogenous rate of technical progress in traditional neoclassical growth models in the sense that it increases per capita income and real wages. fJ(1 -q) is the elasticity of production of public factors with respect to output. This can most easily be seen from (1') where the sum of the coefficients exceeds one by fJ(1 -q) or equivalently, H from (12') in (1) and H' according to (4) yield
The rate of population growth matters because of the non-rivalrous character of B, which is used all the more the larger the population is. This is due to the role of the household as a human capital producing firm according to Schultz 
The golden rule for basic scientific research in this model says that the rate of taxation should equal the elasticity of production of public factors in final output. Nevertheless, the implementation of such a golden rule is rather unlikely to occur. This will be explained in two steps: The first is to make explicit the redistributive character of this tax in comparison to a Lindahl equilibrium; the second is to show that the welfare criterion which produced (16) will only be accepted in case of perfect compensation, which is impossible if the government does not know all the individual production functions (4). The consequence is that distributional conflict occurs, whose outcome is rather unclear.
Let's compare the golden rule to Lindahl equilibrium, which is merely used as a standard of comparison because it allows to summarize the three differences in endowments K', ei and L' in one criterion, Y'/L'2, in (18) For an individual who has c.p. lower (higher) income-say, due to lower capital endowments-or higher (lower) abilities [and therefore higher (lower) L'; see (12)], the flat-rate income tax is a lower (higher) burden in case of golden rule taxation than the Lindahl price because he has to pay less taxes on capital income and is able to make better use of public factors respectively. Thus, in general the flat-rate income tax is clearly redistributive. Therefore it is clear that golden rule taxation is only agreed upon if the maximization of aggregate steady-state consumption is accompanied by the promise of compensation for the redistribution implied by golden rule taxation when compared to Lindahl pricing. Clearly, perfect compensation would yield the same tax burden as Lindahl prices.
In the literature, Lindahl prices are usually held to be unfeasible because the government would have to know all the production functions, and this informational requirement is assumed to be too difficult. The same argument applies when we discuss the inferiority of central planning. But precisely perfect compensation requires that the government know all the production functions (4) and therefore has to be ruled out here due to prohibitive information costs. Without perfect compensation the implementation of the golden rule will not be agreed upon, and is as unfeasible as Lindahl pricing. Then the redistributive character of the flat-rate income tax may lead to distributional conflict: Those with c.p. higher income, out of higher capital (or labor) endowments, or lower abilities than average would vote for lower taxation and those with c.p. lower income or higher abilities than average would vote for higher taxation-if voting were possible. Negotiations upon non-linear tax schedules would suffer from the same informational problems, because those who have lower income or higher abilities than average would have to offer compensations to those with higher income and lower abilities if Pareto improvements were negotiated upon. The latter would then have an incentive to overstate their deviation from the average and the redistribution of the golden rule taxation. Unless the impact of the overstatement on the information of the government were zero, this would lead to lower taxation. Clearly this kind of overstatement is an element of the political bargaining process.
To summarize, if perfect compensation were possible it could be expected that the economy in our model would develop according to the golden rule. But if compensatory arrangements cannot be found, due to similar informational problems such as those which render central planning or Lindahl equilibria impossible, then we must expect a deviation from golden rule development.
Assume that the government maximizes the welfare of the median voter. Democratization processes that start from low taxation and approach median voter democracy may in turn be viewed as a process towards the golden rule taxation and beyond. As this is rather likely to increases wages, Schultz's (1964, p. 196/7) view is supported here that provision of public factors and the democratic process is an effective way to alleviate the poverty of the poorest. If an increase of the flat-rate income tax occurs over time, inequality will be reduced. So this model does not support the view that there must be rising inequality in the initial phases of the development process.
4. Summary 1. The first conclusion of this paper is that the introduction of human capital produced by use of public factors which are financed in turn by a simple flat-rate income tax, leads to an interpretation of the elasticity of public factors in output production multiplied by the rate of population growth as the rate of growth of real wages.
2. Optimal taxation requires that the tax rate is equal to this elasticity. 3. For the median voter, defined as an individual with less than average income per labour hour spent in education, golden rule taxation is lower for him than one in Lindahl equilibrium. He therefore prefers higher than golden rule taxation. Therefore median voter democracy, defined as the application of taxation in accordance with the preferences of the median voter under a flat-rate income tax, leads to non-optimal growth. 4. Individuals with higher than average income per hour spent in education prefer a lower tax rate than that of the golden rule. If this preference is implemented by policy, aggregate consumption and real wages will be lower than under golden rule taxation.
5. The last two results suggest that the democratic process starting from low taxation first helps to approach the optimal growth path by removing tax resistance, and secondly moves on to a level of taxation that exceeds the golden rule level. Therewith poverty is reduced during the democratization process.
All these results have been obtained by formalizing some of the ideas of T. W. Schultz (1964, especially pp. 150-200) on the development process.
The main difference between this approach to real wage determination and other models discussed in the introduction is the outstanding role of economic policy in economic development, which is brought to the fore by the introduction of public factors. This then leads to the outstanding importance of democracy for the development process.
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